Seventh Circuit Review
Volume 9

Issue 1

Article 3

9-1-2013

Distinguishing the Corporal From the Divine: Legal Fictions Create
Bodies Not Souls
Daisy Ayllon
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Daisy Ayllon, Distinguishing the Corporal From the Divine: Legal Fictions Create Bodies Not Souls, 9
Seventh Circuit Rev. 21 (2013).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol9/iss1/3

This Constitutional Law is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent
College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seventh Circuit Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly
Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

Ayllon: Distinguishing the Corporal From the Divine: Legal Fictions Creat

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 9, Issue 1

Fall 2013

DISTINGUISHING THE CORPORAL
FROM THE DIVINE: LEGAL FICTIONS
CREATE BODIES NOT SOULS
DAISY AYLLON
Cite as: Daisy Ayllon, Distinguishing the Corporal From the Divine: Legal Fictions
Create Bodies Not Souls, 9 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 21 (2013), at
http://www.kentlaw.iit.edu/Documents/Academic Programs/7CR/v9-1/ayllon.pdf.

INTRODUCTION
That which is constitutionally shielded is the right of
the human mind and soul to pursue the ultimate
existential questions of love, meaning and spiritual
destiny—arguably the most personal of quests that
determine our humanity and distinguish us from the
non-human beasts that tread the earth. It is also what
most distinguishes us from the non-human or 'fictional'
entities that are the soulless creations of man-made
laws: corporations. Because they are wholly devoid of
humanity and existentially oblivious, neither beasts nor
artificial "persons" need be constitutionally shielded
from that which might otherwise stifle such a quest.1

 J.D. candidate, May 2014, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law; B.A.,
Villanova University. I would like to thank Michael Perna, who always believes.
Mom and Dad, thank you for the things you taught me through actions and
sacrifices. Professor Sheldon Nahmod, thank you awakening my love for
Constitutional law.
1
E-mail from Michael R. Perna, Partner, Perna & Abracht, LLC to Daisy
Ayllon (November 17, 2013, 10:45 CST).
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The right to exercise religion is a “shield, not a sword.”2 This
guarantee —safeguarded both constitutionally3 and statutorily4—
protects individuals against substantial burdens on their religious
exercise,5 and should not be used offensively to impose one’s religious
convictions on others or to advance attitudes that are essentially
political albeit informed by a particular moral or religious perspective.
The constitutional admonition that Congress should not legislate
religion and morality6 presupposes that it likewise should not disdain
secularly purposed legislation simply to placate certain moral-turnedpolitical attitudes. In recent months, the scope of free-exercise
protections has attracted significant attention in the context of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s requirement that
employer-provided health insurance plans comply with a “preventative
care requirement” that offers women of reproductive age contraceptive
methods, sterilization procedures, patient education, and counseling
services.7

2

O’Brien v. U.S. Dept. of Human Health Services, 894 F.Supp.2d 1149, 1160
(E.D. Mo. 2012).
3
U.S. Const. amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”).
4
The text of 42 U.S.C. §2000bb is as follows:
“(a) In general
Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection
(b) of this section.
(b) Exception
Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.” 42 U.S.C.§2000bb (1993).
5
Id.
6
U.S. Const. amend. I.
7
Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS.
ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited October 19, 2013).
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Plaintiffs challenging the “contraceptive mandate,” as it is
commonly known, argue that it violates their rights under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) because it imposes a
substantial burden on their religious exercise without meeting strict
scrutiny.8 Although these challenges do present courts with a novel
issue (whether a secular, for-profit corporation is a “person” capable
of “exercising religion”), the answer to the broader question should be
clear: requiring corporate-provided health insurance plans to include
coverage for contraceptives does not ipso facto violate the freeexercise rights of corporate shareholders.
In the consolidated cases of Korte v. Sebelious and Grote v.
Sebelious, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently had an
opportunity to address these questions. The plaintiffs—two Catholic
families and their respective corporations—filed suit seeking
preliminary injunctions barring enforcement of the contraceptive
mandate against them. Contrary to this writer’s ultimate conclusion,
the Seventh Circuit held that: (1) the families as well as their
companies had standing to challenge the mandate; (2) compelling
secular, for-profit corporations to cover these services violates their
religious-exercise rights; and (3) the government cannot justify the
burden under strict scrutiny.9 Although Judge Rovner agreed with her
colleagues regarding standing,10 she wrote a dissenting opinion
arguing that secular, for profit corporations should not be accorded
free-exercise rights.11 She further reasoned that the contraceptive
mandate does pose a direct burden on the shareholders’ exercise of
religion because the mandate “does not require them to alter their own
practices in any way,” and it is the corporate health plans (not they)
that fund the insurance plans provided to employees.12
8

Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec. of U.S. Dept. of Health and Human
Services, 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013) cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3139 ( 2013);
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013) cert. granted,
82 U.S.L.W. 3139 ( 2013).
9
Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 2013).
10
Id. at 693 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
11
Id. at 715.
12
Id.
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This Comment argues that the Seventh Circuit erred in
granting relief. First, it will briefly examine the Affordable Care Act’s
pertinent provision and present a general overview of the development
of free-exercise law. This Comment will then survey the ongoing
litigation across the country, focusing on the Seventh Circuit’s
opinion. Finally, in concluding that the Seventh Circuit incorrectly
held that secular, for-profit corporations can exercise religion, this
Comment will consider Judge Rovner’s hypotheticals because they
serve the two-fold purpose of illustrating the wide-ranging
consequences of the Court’s opinion, and distancing us from the
incendiary rhetoric associated with issues of sex, abortion, and
religion.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. The Affordable Care Act
In 2010, Congress enacted the Affordable Care Act, 13 to
“increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance and
decrease the cost of health care.” 14 One requirement of the
Affordable Care Act is that employee healthcare plans provide
minimum levels of coverage to plan participants.15 The Affordable
Care Act also imposes a general requirement that employer-sponsored
group health care plans cover “preventative care and screenings.” 16
With respect to women,17 employers are expected to provide

13

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No.111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010).
14
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012).
15
See 42 U.S.C §300gg-13(a)(4)(2013).
16
Id.
17
Studies have found that 45% of women delay or avoid preventive care
because of its costs. Additionally, because women require more health care services
than men and have lower average incomes, their health care cost burden is
significantly higher than men. See Women at Risk: Why Many Women Are
Foregoing Needed Health Care, THE COMMON WEALTH FUND MAG. (May 2009),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/2009
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additional preventative care as determined by the Health Resources
and Services Administration (“HRSA”).18
Following this statutory directive, and after consultation with
the National Academy of Science,19 HRSA promulgated additional
guidelines requiring employers with at least fifty employees20 to
provide group health plans that cover well-woman visits; gestational
diabetes screening; testing and counseling for certain sexually
transmitted diseases; and breastfeeding support, supplies, and
counseling.21 Relevant here, the guidelines also require plans to cover
“[a]ll Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods,
sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all
women with reproductive capacity.”22 These no-cost23 preventative
coverage requirements became effective on August 1, 2012.24
Like many other Congressional acts, the Affordable Care Act
carves out exemptions for religious employers.25 Recognizing the

/May/Women%20at%20Risk/PDF_1262_Rustgi_women_at_risk_issue_brief_Final.
pdf.
18
See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a)–(d)(2010).
19
Clinical Preventative Services for Women: Closing the Gaps, INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES,
http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2011/Clinical-Preventive-services-for-Women-Closingthe-Gaps.aspx (last visited Dec. 4, 2013).
20
See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a)–(d)(2010).
21
Women's Preventive Services Guidelines: Affordable Care Act Expands
Prevention Coverage for Women's Health and Well–Being, HEALTH RESOURCES &
SERVS. ADMIN., http:// www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2013).
22
Id.
23
Congress required coverage of Women's Preventive Healthcare in order to
address inequities in the current healthcare system, which leads “women of
childbearing age [to] spend 68 percent more in out-of-pocket health care costs than
men.” 155 CONG. REC. S12027 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Gillibrand).
24
Women's Preventive Services Guidelines: Affordable Care Act Expands
Prevention Coverage for Women's Health and Well–Being, HEALTH RESOURCES &
SERVS. ADMIN., http:// www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2013).
25
76 Fed. Reg. 46621-01 (Dep’t of Treasury August 3, 2011) (“the definition set
forth here is intended to reasonably balance the extension of any coverage of
contraceptive services under the HRSA Guidelines to as many women as possible,

25
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religious sensitivity of contraceptive coverage, the Affordable Care
Act exempts “churches, their integrated auxiliaries, conventions or
associations of churches, and the exclusively religious activities of
religious orders.”26 Additionally, certain non-exempt, non-profit
religious organizations may receive an “accommodation” allowing
them to route contraceptive payments through their insurance
carriers.27 The Affordable Care Act also allows certain
“grandfathered” plans to avoid providing contraceptive-coverage for a
limited time; however, the government estimates that these
grandfathered plans will be phased-out within a few years.
To ensure compliance, the Affordable Care Act imposes
certain financial penalties. Non-exempt employers who refuse to offer
healthcare plans that include these services face a penalty of $100 per
day, per employee.28 If an employer fails to provide health insurance
altogether, it faces an annual penalty for each employee. 29 Finally, the
Department of Labor or any plan participant may bring suit against an
employer that fails to comply with the regulations. 30
In an unprecedented expansion of the free exercise clause, the
Seventh Circuit held—and this Comment suggests incorrectly so—that
the contraceptive mandate violates the religious rights of corporate
shareholders.
B. Development of Free Exercise Law
The free exercise clause “embraces two concepts—freedom to
believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of
things, the second cannot be.” 31 The free exercise clause is usually
invoked in one of the following situations: (1) when the government
while respecting the unique relationship between certain religious employers and
their employees in certain religious positions.”).
26
26 U.S.C. §6033(a)(3)(A)(i), (iii)(2010).
27
45 C.F.R §147.131(b)(2013).
28
26 U.S.C. § 4980D(b)(1)(2005).
29
See id. § 4980H.
30
See id. § 4980H.
31
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-304 (1940).
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prohibits behavior that a person’s religion mandates;32 (2) when the
government requires conduct that a person’s religion prohibits;33 and
(3) when a law impermissibly burdens a person’s religious
observances. 34 Only the second of these situations is relevant to the
contraceptive mandate.
1. Articulation of Strict Scrutiny Test
Before the 1960s, the Supreme Court had never explicitly
articulated a test governing free-exercise-clause challenges.35 But in
Sherbert v. Verner,36 the court expressly held that strict scrutiny was
the appropriate test for evaluating laws burdening the free exercise of
religion. There, the Court declared unconstitutional the denial of
unemployment benefits to a woman (a member of the Seventh-day
Adventist Church) who was discharged from her job because she
refused to work on the Sabbath. 37 The Court said that the denial of
benefits was a substantial burden on religion because it forced the
woman to choose between an income and her faith.38 Because no
compelling interest justified the burden, the Court ruled against the
government. The Court would continue to apply this test —albeit not
always with consistent rigor39 — for almost three decades.40

32

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding the
constitutionality of a law forbidding polygamy even though it conflicted with
Mormon belief that polygamy is required by their religion).
33
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (rejecting a challenge by Amish
business owner who claimed that paying Social Security taxes violated their
sincerely-held religious beliefs).
34
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
35
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
1292-1924 (4th ed. 2011).
36
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 406.
39
See e.g., U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (Court avoids using the language
of strict scrutiny, speaking instead of an “overriding” governmental purpose to
justify burden in religion).
40
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 32, at 1292.
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2. Smith’s Change to Rational Basis Test
The law changed significantly in 1990 when the Court decided
Employment Division v. Smith. 41 The Court held that the protections
of the free exercise clause are unavailable when the government passes
a neutral law of general applicability. 42 Thus, Justice Scalia wrote,
“the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the
obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes)
conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’” 43 In Smith the
Court was asked to determine whether a law prohibiting consumption
of peyote, a hallucinogenic substance, violated the free exercise clause
when such use was required by some Native American religions.44 The
Court found the law constitutional because it applied to all state
residents and did not punish conduct solely because it was religiously
motivated. 45 With Smith, the Court abandoned strict scrutiny in the
case of neutral laws of general applicability, which only had to pass
rational basis review even if the law imposed a substantial burden on
someone’s religion.46
Since 1990, the only application of Smith was in Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, where the Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional a city ordinance that prohibited ritual
sacrifice of animals because the ordinance “had as [its] object the
suppression of religion.” 47 The Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye
practiced the Afro-Caribbean-based religion of Santeria.48 Santeria
used animal sacrifice as a form of worship in which an animal's
carotid arteries would be cut and, except during healing and death
rights, the animal would be eaten. Shortly after the announcement of
41

494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Id. at 881.
43
Id. (citation omitted).
44
Id.
45
Id. at 878-889.
46
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 32, at 1303-1305.
47
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993).
48
Id. at 527.
42
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the establishment of a Santeria church in Hialeah, Florida, the City
Council adopted several ordinances prohibiting ritual sacrifice of
animals. Because the Court determined that the law was neither
neutral nor of general applicability, it applied strict scrutiny, and held
that the government failed to demonstrate that it had a compelling
interest in prohibiting animal sacrifice. 49
After these cases, the free exercise jurisprudence was wellsettled: laws that were neutral and of general applicability only had to
meet rational basis review, while laws directed at religious practices
had to meet strict scrutiny. In 1993, however, Congress altered this
jurisprudence through RFRA.50
3. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
The principles and history of the First Amendment and RFRA
are intertwined. The Supreme Court’s holding in Smith sparked public
outrage and prompted religious leaders, churches, civil liberties and
religious organization, and politicians to lobby Congress to overturn
Smith by statute.51 RFRA was adopted to negate the Smith rational
basis test, and to instead require strict scrutiny for all free exercise
claims.52 In particular, RFRA provides that the government may not
“substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion,” even by a law of
general applicability, without demonstrating that the application of the
burden is “the least restrictive means” to advance a “compelling
government interest.” 53 The key provision of the Act states:

49

Id. at 548.
42 U.S.C §2000bb-1(a)-(b) (2006).
51
See generally Carol M. Kaplan, The Devil is in the Details: Neutral,
Generally Applicable Laws and Exceptions From Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045
(2000).
52
Id.
53
Id. (“The purposes of this chapter are— (1) to restore the compelling interest
test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise
of religion is substantially burdened; and (2) to provide a claim or defense to persons
whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.”).
50

29
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Government shall not substantially burden a
person’s exercise of religion even if the burden
results form a rule of general applicability,
except…[g]overnment may substantially burden a
person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates
that application of the burden to the person (1) is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling government interest.54
The statute goes on to define “religious exercise” as “any exercise of
religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of
religious belief.”55 Importantly, however, the statute does not define
the word “person.”
Although in City of Boerne the Supreme Court invalidated
RFRA as applied to the states and local governments,56 the Court later
unanimously upheld RFRA as valid and enforceable against the
federal government in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita.57 Practically
speaking, this means that state and local laws that are neutral and of
general applicability58 must be scrutinized under the less-rigorous
Smith rational basis test, while similar federal laws may be challenged
under RFRA, which automatically triggers strict scrutiny.59
The Supreme Court has articulated guiding principles for
determining when courts should apply strict scrutiny under RFRA to
exempt an individual from compliance with a federal law on the basis
of religious belief.60 First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie
54

Id. §1(a)-(b).
42 U.S.C. §2000bb(a)(3)-(5) (2006).
56
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
57
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
439 (2006).
58
Strict scrutiny still applies to state and local laws that are non-neutral or that
target specific individuals or groups.
59
Ruthann Robson, Puzzling Corporations: The Affordable Care Act and
Contraception Mandate, JURIST.ORG (Nov. 5, 2013),
http://www.jurist.org/forum/2013/11/ruthann-robson-puzzling-corporations.php.
60
Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 428.
55

30
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RFRA claim by proving that the application of the federal statute
imposes a substantial burden on a sincere exercise of religion.61 If the
plaintiff succeeds, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate
that the burden furthers a compelling government interest and that the
regulation or statute is the least restrictive means of advancing that
interest.
II. THE LITIGATION
A. Lawsuits Across the Nation
The question of whether for-profit, private corporations can
exercise religion has created much controversy around the country and
left deep rifts among the circuits. On the one hand, in rejecting the
shareholders’ free-exercise and RFRA claims, 62 the Third and Sixth
Circuits concluded that “for-profit, secular corporations cannot engage
in religious exercise.”63 By contrast, the Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits determined that these types of corporations “are ‘persons’
within the meaning of RFRA” capable of exercising religion.64 The
D.C. Circuit opted for a middle-of-the-road approach. A divided panel
affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s denial of a
preliminary injunction against enforcement of the contraceptive
mandate.65 In essence, the court held that the owners of two closely

61

Id.
Id.
63
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec. of U.S. Dept. of Health and
Human Services, 724 F.3d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 2013) cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3139
( 2013); see also Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 627 (6th Cir.2013)
(concluding that “Congress did not intend the term “person” to cover entities like
Autocam when it enacted RFRA.”).
64
Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 654 (7th Cir. 2013); Annex Med., Inc. v.
Sebelius, No. 13-1118, 2013 WL 1276025 (8th Cir. Feb. 1, 2013); Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1121 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 82
U.S.L.W. 3139 (2013).
65
See Gilardi v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 733 F.3d 1208,
1224 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
62

31
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held, for-profit businesses are likely to succeed on a RFRA challenge
to the mandate, although their companies are not.66
The existing circuit split is likely to deepen rapidly given that
there are more than thirty-five cases pending across the country.67
B. Korte v. Sebelious
The Seventh Circuit’s opportunity to weigh-in on this debate
came in the consolidated cases of Korte v. Sebelious and Grote v.
Sebelious.68 The decision — a sixty-four-page majority ruling and a
ninety-page dissent— has been the most expansive against the
contraceptive mandate among the federal circuits thus far.
While other circuits have ruled in favor of challenges either by
for-profit companies or by their owners individually, the Seventh
Circuit was the first court to rule in favor of, and allow challenges by,
the companies and their respective owners. The Seventh Circuit
framed the issues as follows: (1) “is a secular, for-profit corporation a
‘person’ under RFRA?”; (2) “does the contraceptive mandate
substantially burden the religious exercise rights of any of the
plaintiffs, individual or corporate?”; and, if the answer to both
questions is “yes,” (3) can the government justify the mandate under
strict scrutiny? 69 The court answered these questions “yes,” “yes,” and
“no,” respectively.
1. Plaintiffs: Kortes and K&L Contractors
Cyril and Jane Korte own and operate Korte & Luijohan
Contractors, Inc. (“K&L Contractors”), a construction company whose
portfolio has included water and wastewater treatment plants (one of

66

Id.
See BECKET FOUND,
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/#Legatus (last visited Jan. 2,
2013) for the most up-to-date legal challenges across the country.
68
735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013).
69
Id. at 659.
67
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which was constructed for the U.S. Federal Bureau of Prisons70),
museums, office buildings, county incarceration centers, 71 and, most
recently, renovating the Illinois Supreme Court.72 The company
employs approximately 90 full-time employees, 70 of whom receive
health insurance through a union. 73 The Kortes are followers of the
Catholic faith74 (it is unclear whether any of the employees are
adherents of Catholicism), and similar to the plaintiffs in virtually all
such cases filed across the nation, argue that they “seek to manage
their company in a manner consistent with their Catholic faith,
including its teachings regarding the sanctity of human life, abortion,
contraception, and sterilization.” 75 After realizing the “conflict
between their legal and religious duties,” they promulgated “ethical
guidelines76. . . memorializing the faith-informed moral limitations”77
70

Our Client Testimonials, KORTE &LUITJOHAN CONTRACTORS, INC.,
http://korteluitjohan.us/Documents/justice.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2013).
71
Featured Projects, KORTE &LUITJOHAN CONTRACTORS, INC
http://korteluitjohan.us/featured_project.aspx (last visited Dec. 4, 2013).
72
KORTE &LUITJOHAN CONTRACTORS, INC., http://korteluitjohan.us/ (last
visited Jan. 2, 2013) (follow “News” hyperlink; then follow “Gov. Quinn Announces
$12.6 Million Rehab Project for IL Supreme Court Building” hyperlink). As part of
this project, the company contracted with the state of Illinois to complete the job for
$7, 222, 500.
73
Korte, 735 F.3d at 662.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 654.
76
Id. at 663, n. 5. As cited by the Seventh Circuit, the company's ethical
guidelines state:
1. As adherents of the Catholic faith, we hold to the teachings of the
Catholic Church regarding the sanctity of human life from conception to natural
death. We believe that actions intended to terminate an innocent human life by
abortion, including abortion-inducing drugs, are gravely sinful. We also adhere to
the Catholic Church's teaching regarding the immorality of artificial means of
contraception and sterilization.
2. As equal shareholders who together own a controlling interest in Korte &
Luitjohan Contractors, Inc., we wish to conduct the business ... in a manner that does
not violate our religious faith and values.
3. Accordingly, we and Korte & Luitjohan Contractors, Inc. cannot arrange
for, pay for, provide, facilitate, or otherwise support employee health plan coverage
for contraceptives, sterilization, abortion, abortion-inducing drugs, or related
education and counseling, except in the limited circumstances where a physician

33
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on the type of health insurance coverage they could provide. Of note,
their website is devoid of any reference to their Catholic beliefs or
practices.
2. Plaintiffs: Grotes and Grote Industries
The Grote Family owns and manages Grote Industries, Inc.,
“one of the world’s leading manufactures and marketers of vehicle
lighting and safety systems.” 78 The company has more than one
thousand full-time employees and provides a self-insured health-care
plan.79 Like the Korte plaintiffs, the Grote Family and Grote Industries
argue that complying with the Affordable Care Act would violate their
sincerely held beliefs.

certifies that certain sterilization procedures or drugs commonly used as
contraceptives are being prescribed with the intent to treat certain medical
conditions, not with the intent to prevent or terminate pregnancy, without violating
our religious beliefs.
77
Id. at 655.
78
About Us, GROTE.COM, http://www.grote.com/America/ (last visited Dec. 4,
2013).
79
What is a Self-Insured Health Plan?, SELF INSURANCE INSTITUTE OF
AMERICA.,http://www.siia.org/i4a/pages/Index.cfm?pageID=4546 (last visited Dec.
4, 2013). “A self-insured group health plan (or a 'self-funded' plan as it is also
called) is one in which the employer assumes the financial risk for providing health
care benefits to its employees. In practical terms, self-insured employers pay for
each out of pocket claim as they are incurred instead of paying a fixed premium to
an insurance carrier, which is known as a fully-insured plan. Typically, a self-insured
employer will set up a special trust fund to earmark money (corporate and employee
contributions) to pay incurred claims.”
These plans are popular because, among other things, employers (1) can
customize the plan to meet the specific health care needs of its workforce; (2)
maintain control over the health plan reserves, which enables maximization of
interest income; (3) do not have to pre-pay for coverage, thereby providing for
improved cash flow; (4) are not subject to conflicting state health insurance
regulations/benefit mandates; and (5) are not subject to state health insurance
premium taxes.
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3. The Court’s Opinion: Jurisdictional Hurdles
The Seventh Circuit’s opinion, authored by Judge Sykes,
applied the traditional sliding-scale, two-prong analysis governing
preliminary injunctions: (1) have the plaintiffs no adequate remedy at
law such that they will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction were
denied?; and (2) can the plaintiffs demonstrate a likelihood of success
on the merits? Before addressing the merits of the case, the court
cleared away the possible jurisdictional hurdles.80
The court found that the injury was concrete, particularized,
and actual or imminent (the mandate requires plaintiffs to provide
contraception coverage or pay stiff financial penalties).81 Next, the
court concluded that the Kortes and Grotes (as individuals) have
Article III standing because the mandate injured them in two ways:
first, since the corporations are closely held, “the mandate’s indirect
effect on [their] financial interests as controlling shareholders is a
concrete injury;82 and second, the plaintiffs face “intangible” injury to
their religious-exercise rights because buying the insurance would
“make them complicit in the morally wrongful act of another.”83
According to the plurality, the shareholder-standing rule was
not an impediment to hearing this case for two reasons. First, the court
believed that because the rule is a prudential limitation, it “does not
affect the court’s authority to hear the case.” Moreover, the court
concluded that the government waived this argument by failing to
raise it.84 Second, the court reasoned that using its discretion to
overlook the waiver would be pointless because the plaintiffs would be
able to avail themselves of the rule’s exception, which allows a
“shareholder with a direct, personal interest in the cause of action to
bring suit even if the corporation’s rights are also implicated.”85

80

Korte, 735 F.3d at 667.
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 668.
84
Id. at 668-669.
85
Id. at 668.
81

35

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2013

15

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 3

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 9, Issue 1

Fall 2013

The court also found that the Anti-Injunction Act was not
applicable in this case because “[t]hese suits are not suits ‘for the
purposes of’ restraining the assessment or collection of a tax.”86 In
other words, the contraceptive mandate is not itself a tax provision (i.e.
the aim is not to raise revenue); rather, it is an independent regulatory
mandate.87 Therefore, these Internal Revenue Code provisions are only
tangentially implicated.88 The payment for noncompliance is best
characterized as a “penalty.”89 Indeed, the court reasoned that the high
price for noncompliance “suggests that the congressional objective is
punitive.”90
4. The Court’s Opinion: The Merits
The crux of the court’s analysis focused on whether for-profit
corporations are persons under RFRA.91 The court first noted that the
term “religious exercise” is a broad term.92 Next, the court concluded
that the appropriate definition of the word “person” is the one found in
the Dictionary Act—one that contemplates corporations.93 The court
rejected the government’s argument that the line should be drawn at
religiously affiliated nonprofit corporations.94 It reasoned that such a
line is “nowhere to be found in the text of RFRA or any related act of
Congress.”
Noting that certain nonprofit corporations have been able to
successfully claim free-exercise protection, the court then addressed
whether a for-profit corporation can do the same.95 While
acknowledging that this a novel issue, the court noted that the forprofit aspect is not an impediment because in the past the court has
86

Id. at 669.
Id.
88
Id. at 671.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 672.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 675.
95
Id. at 679.
87
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recognized free-exercise rights of individuals engaged in commercial
or profit-making activity.96 The court relied on United States v. Lee,
which involved an Amish farmer seeking a religious exception from
the obligation to withhold and pay social security taxes for his
employees, for the proposition that the Supreme Court had already
concluded — albeit implicitly— that moneymaking activity is not
enough to foreclose a free-exercise claim. 97 The court also
emphatically concluded that the government’s argument that
“religious exercise is protected in the home and the house of worship
but not beyond”98 is too “circumscribed” because religious people do
not practice their faith in such “compartmentalized” ways.99
Finally, the court found that the contraceptive mandate
imposes a substantial burden on the plaintiffs by placing “enormous
pressure”100 on them to violate their religious beliefs. The fines for
non-compliance, the court argued, would forcer the plaintiffs to
“choose between saving their companies and following the moral
teachings of their faith.”101 Given the burden on religion, in order to
survive strict scrutiny, the contraceptive mandate had to be justified by
a compelling government interest. The court found none.
The government argued that the compelling interests were
public health and gender equality, but the court remained
unconvinced. In fact, it chastised the government for its failure to
identify concrete interests: “By stating the public interests so
generally, the government guarantees that the mandate will flunk the
test.”102 The court noted that such generalized interests make it
impossible to assess whether the required “close-fit” between the
means and the ends is present. “There are many ways to promote
public health and gender equality, almost all of them less burdensome

96

Id.
Id. at 681.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 685.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 686.
97

37

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2013

17

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 3

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 9, Issue 1

Fall 2013

on religious liberty,” the court insisted. 103 In short, in the court’s view,
the government failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that the
mandate survives strict scrutiny.
Judge Rovner dissented. Her discussion is considered below as
part of this Comment’s analysis.
III. ANALYSIS
Never before has the Supreme Court allowed secular, for-profit
corporations to claim religious exercise rights, and for good reason.
The Seventh Circuit’s decision was incorrect in at least two major
respects: first, because their claims derive solely from the alleged
injury to the corporations, the plaintiffs-shareholders do not have
standing to assert a free exercise claim; and second, the majority
wrongfully concluded that for-profit, secular corporations are
“persons” that can exercise religion.
A. Shareholding Standing Rule
The individual shareholder claims should have been dismissed
under the shareholder-standing rule because the individual claims
derive solely from the alleged injury to the corporations. The
shareholder-standing rule, a prudential limit on standing,104 "prohibits
shareholders from initiating actions to enforce the rights of the
corporation unless the corporation's management has refused to pursue
the same action for reasons other than good-faith business
judgment."105 To be sure, prudential-standing limitations are subject to
waiver, but the court has discretion to address such issues sua sponte.
It should have done so here.

103

Id.
Gladstone Realtors v. Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (stating that this
rule is intended to "limit access to the federal courts to those litigants best suited to
assert a particular claim.").
105
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Alcan Aluminium Ltd., 493 U.S. 331, 336
(1990).
104
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Yet the majority held that overlooking the waiver (the
appellees’ failure to raise this issue) would be pointless because the
plaintiffs “fall comfortably within the exception.” This conclusion is
inexplicable. To fall within the exception, the shareholder would have
to have a “direct, personal interest” in the cause of action.106 Here, the
dilemma the plaintiffs pose cannot be separated from the alleged harm
to their companies.
The Sixth Circuit in Autocam Corp. v Sebelius concluded as
much, noting that the basic purpose of a corporation “is to create a
distinct legal entity, with legal rights, obligations, powers, and
privileges different from those of the natural individuals who created
it, who own it, or whom it employs.”107 Thus, it is the corporation, not
the plaintiffs, that is obligated to comply with the Affordable Care
Act’s requirements. Any injury to plaintiffs “stems derivatively from
their fiduciary duties”108 under state law and cannot, in any way, be
classified as a harm distinct from that suffered by the companies.
The argument that the individuals have sustained a direct
injury simply by virtue of being required to fulfill their corporate duty
to implement the contraceptive mandate wholly ignores the
shareholder-standing limitation that requires their cause of action to be
unique to them and not derivative of the corporation. Here, the duty to
comply with the federal regulation in question is an obligation that
“falls solely on the corporations.”109 Any actions (or inactions) by
plaintiff-shareholders were taken not as individuals acting in their
personal capacities, but rather as officers and directors of the
corporations. When acting as fiduciaries, individuals managing a
corporation must set aside their own religious, political, and
philosophical beliefs in order to advance the best interests of the
corporation.110 Or as both the Third and Sixth Circuits recognized,
106

Id.
Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 627 (6th Cir.2013) (citing Cedric
Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001)).
108
Id.
109
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1121 (10th Cir. 2013)
(Bacharach, J concurring).
110
Id.
107
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when individuals chose to incorporate, a “shareholder must give up
some prerogatives, ‘including that of direct legal action to redress an
injury to him as primary stockholder in the business.’” 111 Yet it would
indeed violate their fiduciary duty to the corporation if the plaintiffshareholders were permitted to pick and choose when and to what
extent federal regulations apply to their respective corporations simply
on the basis of their personal beliefs.
But picking and choosing is precisely what these litigants are
doing. Though not discussed in the court’s opinion, the plaintiffs
argued that the companies are “bringing religious free exercise claims
for not only [themselves], but [for their] religious owners.”112 Dubbed
the “pass through theory,” this argument is not only enigmatic, but
also contradicts the shareholder-standing rule requiring that a
shareholder’s cause of action be non-derivative, i.e., separate and
distinct from any corporate cause of action. Moreover, this theory
would allow the corporation to assert the rights of its shareholders.
Stated another way, it would permit corporations to pierce their own
corporate veils “for the purposes of some sectarian principles such as
contraception coverage for employees, but presumably to keep their
protective masks in place regarding personal liability.” 113
This cherry-picking approach is also evident in the way the
plaintiff-shareholders have chosen to define their corporations as
‘religious’ in certain spheres (mostly in private), but have opted to
market them as ‘secular’ to the general public. Perhaps the plaintiffshareholders’ hesitation to publicly defined their corporations as
‘religious’ relates to their prospects for profitability. For example,
were the Kortes to define their corporation as “Catholic,” it is unlikely
that the government would recruit K&L Contractors to renovate
courthouses or build wastewater treatment facilities for the U.S.
Federal Bureau of Prisons, as they have done in the past, out of
111

Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 624 (6th Cir.2013).
Brief for Appellants Grote Industries at 18, Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654
(7th Cir. 2013)(No. 13-1077 Consolidated with No. 12-3841).
113
Ruthann Robson, Puzzling Corporations: The Affordable Care Act and
Contraception Mandate, JURIST.ORG, http://www.jurist.org/forum/2013/11/ruthannrobson-puzzling-corporations.php (last visited on Nov. 5, 2013).
112
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concern with excessive government entanglement with religion.
Because, K&L avoids any reference to religion on its website,
advertising materials, or government contracts, it maintains the ability
to have it both ways: it can hold itself out as “religious” when it wants
to avoid a federal law or regulation, but as “secular” when it seeks
federal benefits such as lucrative government contracts.
Thus, the Seventh Circuit should have dismissed the
shareholder’s claims and should have considered only whether a
corporation is a person capable of exercising religion.
B. Corporate Personhood
RFRA provides a cause of action to “any person whose
religious exercise has been burdened.” 114 The question facing courts
for the first time is whether corporations are “persons” capable of
“religious exercise” under RFRA. Congress did not define the term
“person” when it enacted RFRA. Thus, courts have looked to the
Dictionary Act, which provides default definitions for terms used in
the U.S. Code, for guidance. 115 Admittedly, the Dictionary Act
provides that “the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations,
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock
companies, as well as individuals.” 116 Importantly, however, the
Dictionary Act also cautions courts to look at the context of the statute
to determine whether, in fact, Congress intended such definition to
apply: “In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless
the context indicates otherwise…”117 Therefore, when examining
RFRA, this “context” must necessarily include “the body of free
exercise case law that existed at the time of RFRA’s passage.”118
Examining this context leads to only one logical conclusion:
Congress did not intend to include corporations organized for secular,
114

42 U.S.C §2000bb-1(c) (2006).
See Autocam Corp., 730 F.3d at 626.
116
1 U.S.C §1 (2012).
117
Id. (emphasis added).
118
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1166-68 (10th Cir.
2013) (Briscoe, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
115
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profit-seeking purposes as “persons” under RFRA.119 Specifically,
Congress’s express purpose in enacting RFRA was to restore the type
of claims articulated in Sherbert and Yoder —claims that were
fundamentally personal. In Sherbert, the Court held that strict scrutiny
should be used in evaluating laws burdening free exercise of religion
and declared unconstitutional the denial of unemployment benefits to a
woman who was discharged from her job because she refused to work
on her Saturday Sabbath. 120 In Yoder, also applying strict scrutiny, the
Court held that an individual’s interest in the free exercise of religion
outweighed the State’s interest in compelling school attendance
beyond the eighth grade.121 The plaintiffs in Yoder were members of
the Amish religion and were prosecuted under Wisconsin state law for
failing to send their children to school through age sixteen. The Court
found persuasive the parents’ argument that high school attendance
was contrary to their religious beliefs.122 Thus, in both Sherbert and
Yoder, the plaintiffs complained of actual restrictions on, or penalties
deriving from, their personal behavior.
The holdings of these cases (which acknowledge the personal
nature of free-exercise rights) are congruent with original
Constitutional intent. This nation was founded, and the U.S.
Constitution drafted, on the fundamental premise that individuals
should be free to choose what to believe and how to lead their own
lives.123 Undeniably, the pursuit of happiness presupposes selfawareness. The Framers of the Constitution sought to secure for
individuals conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness, which
include protecting an individual’s choice in forming beliefs, thoughts,
emotions, and sensations.124
It is true that during the last century, the Supreme Court has
held that corporations are persons entitled to numerous constitutional
119

Autocam Corp., 730 F.3d. at 625.
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
121
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972).
122
Id.
123
See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 203 (1986) ((Blackmun, J.,
dissenting), overruled by, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
124
Id. at 207 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564–65 (1969)).
120
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protections, and consequently has invalidated certain laws infringing
upon those corporate rights.125 Tellingly, however, in the 200-year
span between the adoption of the First Amendment and RFRA’s
passage, the Supreme Court has confined free exercise rights to
individuals and non-profit religious organizations.126 That is, never
before has the Supreme Court allowed corporations with no religious
affiliation to claim religious freedom, and justifiably so. Until secular,
for-profit corporations become self-aware, religious freedom in the
pursuit of happiness is simply logically inapplicable to them.
Though the legal doctrine of corporate personhood has allowed
corporations to claim similar Constitutional rights as natural persons in
some spheres,127 corporate personhood is inapplicable to the
contraceptive mandate. Corporate personhood is no more than a legal
fiction used to facilitate commerce,128 which grants corporations
standing to enter into contracts, to hold property, to sue and be sued,

125

The Supreme Court first stated that corporations were persons for purposes
of the Fourteenth Amendment in Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396
(1886).
126
Autocam Corp., 730 F.3d. at 626 (citing Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1166-68
(Briscoe, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
127
Susanna Kim Ripken, Corporate First Amendment Rights After Citizens
United: An Analysis of the Popular Movement to End the Constitutional Personhood
of Corporations, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 209 (2011).
128
See Jeffrey Nesteruk, Persons, Property, and the Corporation: A Proposal
for a New Paradigm, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 543, 564 n.133 (1990) (“A corporation is
artificial in that it is a human creation subject to human choices.”); James V. Schall,
The Corporation: What Is It?, 4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 105, 118 (2006) (describing the
corporation as primarily a human invention created for man's use). Legal personhood
can be given to just about any object if it is deemed to serve the ends of justice. See,
e.g., Richard Tur, The “Person” in Law, in PERSONS AND PERSONALITY: A
CONTEMPORARY INQUIRY 116, 121 (Arthur Peacocke & Grant Gillett eds., 1987)
(referring to a case where an Indian idol was given a legal personality); see also
Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 HARV. L. REV. 347, 350
(1911) (noting that purely inanimate objects may be personified, e.g., the estate of a
deceased person, a jury, or a community). The term “natural person” typically refers
to human beings. See Jessica Berg, Of Elephants and Embryos: A Proposed
Framework for Legal Personhood, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 369, 373 (2007) (“‘Natural
person’ is the term used to refer to human beings' legal status.”).
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and ultimately to carry on business in the corporate name.129 And
although this legal recognition in the commercial context does not
seem particularly problematic, blurring or politicizing the distinction
between natural persons and corporations so as to imbue corporations
with an additional legal fiction of self-awareness does irreparable
harm to very human constitutional notions of individual freedom of
conscience and self-fulfillment. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
consistently cautioned against such harm in its jurisprudence.
Whether a particular guarantee is "purely personal," and thus
unavailable to corporations, “depends on the nature, history, and
purpose of the particular constitutional provision.”130 From a historical
perspective, the notion that corporations must be treated identically to
natural persons —not only in the political sphere, but now also in the
context of religious liberty— is misguided. In his dissent, Justice
Stevens’ analysis in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission is
helpful in understanding how the Framers and their contemporaries
conceived of the First Amendment. To begin, their conception of these
freedoms was narrower than we now think of them.131 They also had
very different views about the “role of corporations in society.”132
Thomas Jefferson, for instance, famously fretted that corporations
would subvert the Republic.133 In Colonial America, corporations were

129

See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02 (2005) stating:
“[E]very corporation has perpetual duration and succession in its corporate name and
has the same powers as an individual to do all things necessary or convenient to
carry out its business and affairs, including without limitation power: (1) to sue and
be sued, ... (4) to ... own, hold, improve, use, and otherwise deal with, real or
personal property, ... (7) to make contracts and guarantees ....”
130
First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n. 14 (1978).
131
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Commn., 558 U.S. 310, 426 (2010)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (referencing Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L. J. 1, 22 (1971)).
132
Id.
133
See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Tom Logan (Nov. 12, 1816), in 12 THE
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 42, 44 (P. Ford ed. 1905) (“I hope we shall . . . crush
in [its] birth the aristocracy of our monied corporations which dare already to
challenge our government to a trial of strength and bid defiance to the laws of our
country.”).
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“authorized by grant of a special legislative character.”134 It was
“assumed that [they] were legally privileged organizations that had to
be closely scrutinized by the legislature because their purposes had to
be made consistent with public welfare.”135
The Framers took it as a given that corporations could be
regulated in the service of public welfare.136 And they had “little
trouble distinguishing corporations from human beings.” 137 Thus,
when the First Amendment was adopted, it was individuals they had in
mind, not corporations.138 Even “the notion that business corporations
could invoke the First Amendment would probably have been quite a
novelty,” given that “at the time, the legitimacy of every corporate
activity was thought to rest entirely in a concession of the
sovereign.”139 As a matter of general expectation, then, it is absurd to
think that corporations are to be treated like, and guaranteed the same
protections as, natural persons—everywhere, all the time, no matter
what.
How, then, does one reconcile the fact that the Supreme Court
has accorded free-speech rights to corporations with the notion that
religious freedom is reserved only for natural persons? The answer to
this question relates to the purposes underlying the respective rights.
In examining the purpose of the constitutional guarantee of free
134

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 426 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
R. SEAVOY, ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION, 1784–
1855 (1982).
136
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 428 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id. (quoting Shelledy, Autonomy, Debate, and Corporate Speech, 18
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 541, 578 (1991); cf. Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 636 (1819) (Marshall, C. J.) (“A corporation is an
artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.
Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter
of its creation confers upon it”); Julian N. Eule, Promoting Speaker Diversity: Austin
and Metro Broadcasting, 1990 S. CT. REV. 105, 129 (“The framers of the First
Amendment could scarcely have anticipated its application to the corporation form.
That, of course, ought not to be dispositive. What is compelling, however, is an
understanding of who was supposed to be the beneficiary of the free speech
guaranty—the individual.”).
135
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speech, the Supreme Court has identified three main functions. First,
freedom of speech is indispensable for self-government. “People
communicate on political matters so that they can intelligently
participate in the democratic process.”140 Second, freedom of speech is
also important because, “in a marketplace of ideas, the better ideas
eventually prevail through competition.”141 Finally, freedom of speech
promotes “self-fulfillment and autonomy.”142 Thus, “because
[corporations] have property, financial, and political interests, [they]
of course have a free speech interest in protecting and promoting those
interests and in pursuing their agendas, be their stated goals charitable,
religious, political, or profit-making.” 143
Free exercise of religion, by contrast, is an intensely individual
endeavor, one that deals with an individual’s personal conscience, and
one that is essential to an individual’s relationship with his Creator. As
James Madison put it: “the Religion then of every man must be left to
the conviction and conscience of every man.” 144 In short, unlike
freedom of corporate speech, the right to exercise one’s religion serves
a purely personal objective. For as the Supreme Court has said, certain
“purely personal” guarantees (such as the privilege against selfincrimination) “are unavailable to corporations and other organizations
because the "historic function" of the particular guarantee has been
limited to the protection of individuals.”145 As such, analogies to
freedom of speech (to promote purely corporate objectives) are not
only illogical but in defiance of the Framers’ concept of what it means
to pursue happiness.
140

Freedom of Speech: Three Rationales, NAHMOD LAW,
http://nahmodlaw.com/2010/01/19/an-introduction-to-freedom-of-speech/ (last
visited December 16, 2013).
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 654 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J.,
dissenting).
144
James Madison, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM,
http://religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/sacred/madison_m&r_1785.html (last visited
December 16, 2013).
145
First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n. 14 (1978)
(citations omitted).
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Ignoring all of this, the Seventh Circuit extended arguably the
most personal constitutional right to a “man-made legal fiction that has
no conscience enabling belief or worship.”146 Perhaps if the stakes
were not so high, the court’s ruling would not be so problematic. But
as Judge Rovner aptly notes, the court’s expansive and unfounded
interpretation of RFRA threatens to allow corporations not only to
protect their rights, but to use these protections as a sword against
others (as opposed to as a shield to protect individuals from substantial
government burdens on religious exercise147) and to evade complying
with the law whenever a shareholder’s views conflict with it.148
Judge Rovner’s hypotheticals illustrate this point poignantly as
she urges us in her dissent to consider the ramifications of holding that
a corporation is a ‘person.’ She asks us to suppose, for instance, that
an employee has Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (“ALS”)149,
commonly known as Lou Gehrig’s Disease, and has been accepted
into a clinical trial testing the effectiveness of an embryonic stem-cell
therapy on ALS. Under the Affordable Care Act, the company’s health
plan must cover the costs of routine care associated with clinical trials
involving treatment for cancer and other life-threatening conditions.
Suppose also that the employer’s sole owner and chief executive
officer shares the United Methodist Church’s disapproval of research
and therapies based on stem cells. Based on the plurality’s ruling, the
owner and corporation would have a colorable argument that the
Affordable Care Act (and perhaps other federal laws) substantially
burdens their free exercise rights.150 This rationale would make
virtually any federal law subject to the vagaries of the religious beliefs
of any controlling corporate shareholder. It also means that courts
would have to constantly revisit the nature of a corporation’s asserted
146

Korte, 735 F.3d at 688 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
O'Brien, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1159.
148
Id. at 689.
149
Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, PUB-MED HEALTH,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001708/ (last visited December
16, 2013). ALS is a progressive neurodegenerative disease that affects nerve cells in
the brain and spinal cord. When the nerve cells die, the person becomes paralyzed.
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Korte, 735 F.3d at 690 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
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religious interests because, as Judge Rovner points out, it is unclear
what beliefs would be attributable to a corporation if, for example, one
of a corporation’s two equal owners is Catholic and the other Muslim,
or if the corporation changes ownership, or if the owners have “diverse
degrees of devotion and diverse notions as to whether and how the
corporation ought to reflect their religious beliefs.”151
Judge Rovner then asks us to consider an even more
preposterous potential outcome of the plurality’s holding: imagine that
a corporation's sole owner is "a life-long member of the Church of
Christ, Scientist. Christian Science dogma postulates that illness is an
illusion or false belief that can only be addressed through prayer which
realigns one’s soul with God."152 Imagine also that the owner believes
that his company’s compliance with the Affordable Care Act’s
mandate to cover traditional medical care would be a violation of his
religious principles. As in the prior case, this owner would also have a
colorable legal claim. Judge Rovner recognizes in both hypotheticals
that the government would likely argue that it has a compelling
interest in pursuing universal healthcare access. Even so, under the
plurality’s decision, the government’s argument would be defeated
because it could pursue its goals through less-restrictive means, which
would not require companies to subsidize healthcare that is
inconsistent with the owner’s personal beliefs. 153
What these hypotheticals demonstrate is that the Seventh
Circuit’s ruling allows employers to invoke the free exercise clause
“offensively rather than defensively […and it permits] corporate
employers to rewrite the terms of the statutorily-mandated health plans
they provide to their employees.”154
IV. CONCLUSION
Both the Grotes and the Kortes chose to incorporate, thereby
obtaining both the advantages and disadvantages of the corporate
151

Id. at 704.
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Id. at 691.
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Id.
152
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form. In applying Constitutional rights to inanimate entities, and in
interpreting the scope of religious freedom, courts must draw sensible
lines because virtually anything can potentially affect someone’s
religious freedoms. In drawing these lines, the Seventh Circuit should
have at least considered whether the contraceptive mandate directly
targets or otherwise actively interferes with the free exercise of
religion, or whether it is instead merely the type of minimal burden
that every person living in a cosmopolitan society must endure. It also
should have paused before imbuing corporations with a spiritual
existence, effectively creating an additional legal fiction that christens
corporations as self-aware ‘persons’ with the constitutional right to
pursue happiness through the exercise of religion. After all, the human
impulse to explore spirituality is existential in nature, and as such was
afforded constitutional protection by the Framers. It is also an impulse
to which corporations are oblivious.

49

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2013

29

